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Green: On the Knowledge of God and the Metaphysics of Aquinas

ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD AND THE METAPHYSICS OF AQUINAS
Tom Green
I.

Introduction
The endeavour of the theologian is to discover the meaning of the utterances of divine

revelation. But, “keeping his eye fixed upon his own goal, he must additionally take into
consideration everything else he knows about the subject under discussion”.1 For his subject
extends to the whole created order, and there are many human sciences which assist in this
knowledge. Metaphysics, above all these human sciences, aims to articulate the reasons why
of reality as a whole, giving voice about things as they are. Therefore, it can be seen that the
disciplines of theology and metaphysics have the same subject. When Aquinas, the theologian,
begins then, to give a rational account of his Christian faith, he does not err in using his
theological beliefs as a platform to his philosophical demonstrations.
This essay, more than anything, is an attempt to determine the credibility of Thomas
Aquinas’ metaphysics, particularly as presented in the Summa Theologiae. Therein, Aquinas
argues that the existence of God must be demonstrated rationally, but he does so on the
presupposition that his Christian faith is true. Hence, I will begin by giving an overview of his
arguments concerning how humans acquire knowledge generally, for this will help us to see
how metaphysical knowledge is possible at all. Then, I will demonstrate how he thinks we can
come to know that God, the principle subject of metaphysics, exists. On this basis, I will argue
that Aquinas presupposes the existence of God and why that does not discredit him.
II. Human Knowledge and the Possibility of Metaphysics
As a way of proceeding, we shall outline what Aquinas argues regarding human
knowledge in general. In this way, we shall see how metaphysical knowledge is possible in his
philosophical system. Human beings are composites of body and soul. Thus, a human being
apprehends sensible objects through its sense organs as a composite. But this knowledge of
sensible objects is only of particulars; the senses cannot account for the apprehension of
universals.2 For example, dogs, also sensible creatures, can hear the sharp sound of a whistle
but they cannot grasp what a whistle is. The apprehension of the material through sensation
effects an image (phantasm) in the imagination, but this image remains particular and its
1
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reception passive; more is needed for real knowledge. So how is universal knowledge derived?
The rational soul of the human is unaffected by the sensible apprehension of the material. There
is needed, therefore, an activity of the soul, since the idea of, say a whistle, cannot be formed
passively in the way in which the phantasm is.3 Aquinas does not say how it happens, but only
that there is the active intellect which abstracts from the phantasm or image the universal
concept.4 It is important to underline here, that for Aquinas, there is no innate knowledge for
humans; the active intellect awaits the reception of data from without, or the recollection of
phantasms already in the imagination, from which it abstracts the universal concept – what a
thing really is.5 Thus, there is no knowledge without the phantasms.
Therefore, according to Aquinas, if all natural human knowledge is derived from the
material world through the senses how can we attain knowledge of the immaterial? How can
there be knowledge of things which are not objects of sensation, like God? Well, things are
only apprehended by the intellect in so far as they are intelligible and things are intelligible only
in so far as they are in act. To be in act is to be.6 What Aquinas means is that things are only
intelligible in as much as they are potencies moving toward their end. This movement is the
explanation of what a thing is essentially.7 A chair is in as much as it is formed so as to be sat
upon. So, a chair is acting as a chair ought to if it is able to be sat upon, and is thus fulfilling
its potential.

Hence, the intellect has its primary object in being. And so, for the embodied

human intellect, the proper object of its apprehension is the material, but this without foregoing
its fundamental orientation toward being qua intellect.8 Thus, human knowledge may begin
with sense data, but is able, in as much as the intellect is ordered toward the apprehension of
being in general, to know beyond what is sensible, to know the metaphysical. However, and
crucially, since the human intellect can only know through the phantasms sensation produces,
knowledge of immaterial things is only possible in as much as they are manifested in material
things.9
But how does Aquinas account for any positive knowledge of immaterial things? We
certainly cannot know of immaterial substances what they are essentially, for it is beyond our
intellectual capacity as humans to do so – these are substances which are essentially superior

3
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to humans and therefore cannot be grasped wholly and essentially by that which is inferior.10
In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas affirms the approach of many natural theologians who
spoke of God in the via negativa – by way of negating of God the things which are more
properly human.11 For example, to say ‘God is infinite’, simply means to say, ‘God is not
finite’. Or, when we refer to God as immutable, we are not attributing any positive content to
the nature of God, but only that he is not changing. We see that humans change, and they do
so as beings moving from potency to act, but God is Pure Act and so there is in Him no change.
But in affirming the via negativa, Aquinas does not deny the possibility of defining God more
positively, that is, he argues for the via affirmativa – we can know God and describe him
positively.12 For instance, if we call God wise, we are ascribing to Him a human quality, for it
is the only kind of wisdom we have access to naturally. But it cannot be exactly the same, for
the wisdom that God would possess would be beyond what we are capable of acquiring and
would not be subject to our natural limitations.13 So, when we attribute wisdom to God, we are
saying that he is more than wise, which has positive content – we know the quality of wisdom
in men, but in God the quality of wisdom exceeds what we normally experience it to be in our
limited nature and we are incapable of understanding fully what it means.14 However, “the
infinity of…God means that the finite human mind can attain no adequate and perfect idea of
God’s nature, but it does not mean that it cannot attain an imperfect and inadequate notion of
God’s nature”.15 Thus, for Aquinas, positive knowledge of the metaphysical, specifically God,
is possible to the human mind.
III. Coming to Know God
Arriving at the possibility of knowing God is just the start. In discovering the capability
of metaphysical knowledge, we are able to articulate what we might be able to say about God
if he existed. But does he exist, and according to Aquinas, how might we arrive at this
conclusion? Aquinas articulates about humans that “to know in a general and confused way
that God exists is implanted in us by nature.”16 From this, Alvin Plantinga sets up his famous
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account of warrant whereby he argues the existence of God is self-evident.17 Using John
Calvin, who supposedly builds upon this quote from Aquinas, Plantinga argues that it is this
natural disposition (what he calls the sensus divinitatis) by which human beings can come to a
basic belief about the existence of God.18 By virtue of this sensus divinitatis, for example, one
can gaze at the starry heavens and from this, without inference from any other proposition, be
warranted in believing that God exists and that he made it so. And Plantinga presents quite a
convincing argument. If we are naturally disposed to know God, and when, gazing in wonder
at creation we think of Him, wouldn’t that be enough to say that knowledge of God is selfevident?
Aquinas, though, states plainly his position against such notions. He describes two ways
in which a thing may be self-evident: “in itself, though not to us [and] in itself, and to us”.19
Propositions are self-evident if their predicate is contained in the essence of the subject, as in
the proposition, “water is wet”. Thus, for those who know the predicate and the subject, this
kind of statement will be self-evident. But if the predicate or the subject are unknown to
someone, then the statement will be self-evident in itself, but not to one who lacks that
knowledge. In this sense, the proposition, “God exists” is self-evident in itself, for the predicate
is contained in the essence of the subject (that is, God’s essence is his existence, as Aquinas
goes on to argue), but it is not self-evident to us for we do not know the essence of God.20 In
Aquinas’ reply to the type of objection Plantinga raises, he points out that, though man is
naturally capable of knowledge of the divine, this does not mean that we are able absolutely to
know He exists, “just as to know someone is approaching, is not the same as to know Peter is
approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching”.21 We might have made a lucky guess
to say that God exists from gazing into the starry heavens, but we do not know it absolutely.
How then do we know that God exists?
The proposition, ‘God exists’, “needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known
to us, though less known in their nature—namely, by effects”.22 [italics mine] A demonstration
is performed in one of two ways: either through the cause or through the effect. To argue
17

Alvin Plantinga, "Warranted Belief in God," In Warranted Christian Belief, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000, Oxford Scholarship Online, 2003), doi: 10.1093/0195131932.003.0006.
18 Plantinga, "Warranted Belief in God”.
19 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, Q.2, art.1.
20 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, Q.2, art.1.
21 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, Q.2, art.1.
22
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, Q.2, art.2. All Aquinas means here by “less known in their nature”
is that a thing is less intelligible than its cause because it is less perfect. God, Pure Act, is the most
knowable substance by nature.
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through the cause would be to argue from what is prior in being, whereas to demonstrate from
the effect “is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us”. That is, to make a demonstration
from an effect would be to argue from what is more knowable to us, as its essence is more
apprehensible to the human intellect. And thus, “when an effect is better known to us than its
cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause.”23 For Aquinas, this kind of
demonstration is applicable to all that is intelligible – we can know all things provided their
effects are known to us. For, “since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the
cause must pre-exist”.24 Therefore, God’s existence can be demonstrated from His effects,
from creation. In the following article of the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas goes on to give his
five demonstrations for God’s existence, and thus, portrays not only the possibility for
metaphysical knowledge, but indeed that there is One whose existence is the ground of all other
existing things.

IV. The Crucial Presupposition
If we have paid due attention to the chain of Thomas’ arguments presented here, we will
notice something peculiar to his philosophical method. Of particular note is the argument
expressed in the preceding paragraph wherein he states that the existence of God ought to be
demonstrated and how so. We demonstrate God’s existence, says Aquinas, by arguing from
what is better known to us to what is less known to us; by arguing from the effect, the existence
of the cause.25 But a cause is prior to its effect. So, in performing a demonstration of this kind,
the philosopher presupposes the existence of the cause about which he makes his conclusion.
Aquinas does not shy away from such an admission, for he himself quotes St Paul saying, "for
the invisible things of [God], from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood
by the things that are made; his eternal power also, and divinity" (Rom 1:20).26 According to
the account of human knowledge and its capabilities that we have explored above, this method
is true not only for demonstrations of God’s existence but about immaterial substances in
general, for he claims that the knowledge of these, far surpassing the limitations of the human
intellect, are manifested to us in their effects.27 So, in the Summa, Thomas Aquinas presents

23
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an account of deriving metaphysical knowledge which presupposes the existence of the causes,
the Cause, about which he wants to draw conclusions.
How problematic is this to metaphysics? Ought we not presume rather the opposite –
that God does not exist, or at least that we do not know whether there is a first cause? When
Aristotle considers the science which is to be the first among the sciences, he remarks
pertinently that “if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must
be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to it to
consider being qua being—both what it is and the attributes that belong to it qua being”.28
Metaphysics begins then, at least in the Aristotelian mould of which Aquinas is preeminent, on
a conditional. If there is a first cause, then the knowledge of this must be first among
philosophical investigations, because by it we are more readily able to explain the reasons why
of things in general. So, then, it is not erroneous of itself to presume that there is a first cause
– it is in fact, according to Aristotle, helpful as a starting point for all philosophical enquiries.29
Now, this quotation does not presuppose that God exists like the quotations above from Aquinas
seem to, but it does allow the possibility of such an approach.
Which is why when we consider Aquinas, the theologian, it becomes apparent why he
argues in the way he does. Every philosopher must begin his enquiries, his pursuit of wisdom,
with an assent of faith, whatever its content. For example, Descartes places his faith in the
acuity of human reason. Aristotle, on the other hand, gives his assent, not only to reason, but
to the intelligibility of what lies before him in reality. Aquinas accepts Aristotle’s approach,
but he does not stop there.30 For he also gives his assent to the Christian faith; that God has
indeed revealed Himself in the manner that that tradition articulates. There is a certain
symmetry, a harmony, between the science of first philosophy and theology.31 For, as Aristotle
points out in the quotation above, the first philosophy gives us an understanding of reality as a
whole and man’s place in it. Theology, particularly the revelation of God in the Christian faith,
also gives us an explanation of reality as a whole and man’s place in it.32 The latter does so
from a God’s-eye-view, so to speak, while the former, from the point-of-view of man and his
natural capabilities. So, what bars the philosopher from beginning his philosophical endeavour
with a particular world view, as Aquinas does? If his account of things from this point-of-view
does not contradict what we can know naturally, then it hardly matters. One need not agree
28

Aristotle, Metaphysics, 6.1
Ralph McInerny, St. Thomas Aquinas, (London: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 130.
30
Josef Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991), 148.
31
Josef Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991), 149.
32
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with everything he says, but it is hardly reasonable to do away with his whole endeavour based
on the point from which he starts. One would need first to demonstrate the incompatibilities of
the two movements to truth. Aquinas demonstrates the opposite.33

V.

Conclusion
Thomas Aquinas presents in his seminal work, the Summa Theologica, a grand scheme

of reality as a whole and the place of man within it. More specifically, he shows how man is
able to know things, to know the world around him and thus to engage with it and within it.
But he also demonstrates that there is a possibility of knowing things above his nature, of
knowing the metaphysical, of knowing God. And while his demonstration may depend on the
presupposition that God exists, this does not have a deleterious effect on his philosophical
enterprise. For when we consider reality as a whole in metaphysics, the only thing that separates
us from the theologian is our point of view. For both try to give a holistic account of the world
and man’s place therein. Aquinas demonstrates laudably the harmony of both; that what God
has revealed about Himself and the world is a good starting point for man to begin to wonder.

33
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